




University of Bucharest, Romania
A volume in the Advances in Public Policy and 
Administration (APPA) Book Series 
Published in the United States of America by
IGI Global
Information Science Reference (an imprint of IGI Global)
701 E. Chocolate Avenue
Hershey PA, USA 17033
Tel: 717-533-8845
Fax:  717-533-8661 
E-mail: cust@igi-global.com
Web site: http://www.igi-global.com
Copyright © 2021 by IGI Global.  All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or distributed in 
any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, without written permission from the publisher.
Product or company names used in this set are for identification purposes only. Inclusion of the names of the products or 
companies does not indicate a claim of ownership by IGI Global of the trademark or registered trademark.
   Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
British Cataloguing in Publication Data
A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.
All work contributed to this book is new, previously-unpublished material. The views expressed in this book are those of the 
authors, but not necessarily of the publisher.
For electronic access to this publication, please contact: eresources@igi-global.com. 
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This chapter goes beyond classic nudges in introducing public policy practitioners and researchers 
worldwide to a wide range of behavioural change interventions like boosts, thinks, and nudge pluses. 
These policy tools, much like their classic nudge counterpart, are libertarian, internality targeting 
and behaviourally informed policies that lie at the origin of the behavioural policy cube as originally 
conceived by Oliver. This chapter undertakes a review of these instruments, in systematically and ho-
listically comparing them. Nudge pluses are truly hybrid nudge-think strategies, in that they combine 
the best features of the reflexive nudges and the more deliberative boosts (or, think) strategies. Going 
forward, the chapter prescribes the consideration of a wider policy toolkit in directing interventions 
to tackle societal problems and hopes to break the false synonymity of behavioural based policies with 
nudge-type interventions only.
INTRODUCTION
Richard Thaler, in his acceptance speech of the Sveriges Riksbank (aka Nobel) Prize in Economic Sci-
ences, acknowledged his award by attributing his success to his discovery of ‘the presence of human 
life in a place not far, far away, where [other] fellow economists thought it did not exist: the economy’ 
(Thaler, 2017). And justifiably so! The introduction of nudges, as popularised by Thaler and Sunstein 
(2009) through their eponymous book, Nudges: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happi-
ness, has revolutionised the toolkit of a policymaker.
Traditional public policy has largely focused on the prescription of regulatory tools and campaigns. In 
doing so, it has relied on the false belief of a rational man, often referred to as the Homo Economicus in 
common economic parlance. However, man can often be irrational, as has been rightly noted by scholars 
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in economic psychology and behavioural sciences; and, thus, seeking behavioural change in citizens with 
regulatory policies alone, can often run the risk of undermining consumer autonomy and agency, with 
such paternalism being publicly opposed. Thus, the tool kit of any policymaker must involve behavioural 
instruments, like nudges, that steer humans into making welfare improving decisions by tapping into 
their behavioural biases, while restoring liberty.
Nudges, better understood as a tweak in the choice architecture, are conceptually embedded in the 
framework of Libertarian paternalism; paternalistic in steering individuals to make better decisions for 
themselves while being libertarian in that they preserve the choice-set (and liberty) of the decision maker; 
as such, nudges can be conceptualised to be non-coercive interventions that retain all available choice 
alternatives for the decision-making agents; for instance, making fruits more salient by placing them 
near checkout tills counts as a nudge. However, banning chocolates does not. Nudges are not mandates 
or sanctions. Neither do these interventions provide any additional financial or economic incentives to 
alter behaviour, nor do they provide any additional information to aid decision-making processes rela-
tive to what is already available to the agents to begin with. A behavioural change through a nudge is 
brought about only via amendments to the external environment in which an economic agent functions 
and makes lifestyle choices. Nudges have been shown to be good value for money as they promise rela-
tively large benefits at small costs to public organisations (Benartzi et al., 2017). Furthermore, they are 
fairly easy to deliver; for instance, Arno and Thomas (2016), in a systematic review, evaluate that nudges 
reduce obesity by facilitating a 15 percent increase in the uptake of healthier dietary choices, relative to 
traditional public policy campaigns and measures. The success of nudges is far-reaching; for instance, 
they have been shown to help people to save more (Thaler and Benartzi, 2004; Cai, 2019), reconcile 
citizens’ short- and long-term goals (Goldhaber-Fiebert et al., 2010) and generate social welfare benefits 
by reducing overall energy consumption (Allcott and Kessler, 2019).
Nonetheless, as nudges were extensively prescribed, scholars critiqued their application for a variety 
of reasons; for example, nudges target citizen’s biases and heuristics by modifying the choice environment 
in which they operate, and as such often leave citizens out of the deliberative process, compromising 
their ability to own and sustain long-term behavioural changes. A nudge is often deemed to be opaque 
and manipulative, one that co-opts the internal cognitive processes of individuals and overrides their 
consent. Interestingly, nudge theorists view an omniscient and benevolent policymaker as a central unit 
in facilitating any socially beneficial change; however, little do they acknowledge the shortcomings of 
reality in that the social policy planners, in a behavioural world, are also limited by their cognitive abili-
ties and can be motivated by selfish reasons (a.k.a. be rent seeking). But a nudge is not the only available 
behavioural strategy in the toolkit of the policymaker; other alternative behavioural-based interventions 
have been proposed that theoretically commit to overcoming these ethical and moral limitations of nudges.
John et al., (2013, 2019a), for instance, put forward the idea of thinks. Unlike nudges that compromise 
consumer sovereignty, thinks involve large-scale deliberations that enable citizens to own the process 
of behavioural reforms. These often include citizen forums, large scale behavioural therapies, et cetera. 
Thinks can, at best, be thought of as schooling techniques that teach individuals how to be better citizens 
by enabling a transformation to a ‘self-guiding society’ (John and Stoker, 2019b). Nonetheless, while 
thinks are morally superior to nudges, they can be very hard to scale-up and as such might fail cost 
considerations by policymakers. Closely related to the idea of thinks, Hertwig and Grüne-Yanoff (2015; 
2017) and Grüne-Yanoff (2018) recommended updating citizens’ ‘repertoire of skills’ by boosting them. 
Boosts enable individuals to use mental shortcuts (aka heuristics), smartly and effectively; for instance, 
improving statistical skills amongst individuals can reduce numerical fallacies. Other examples include 
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hierarchical decision-making schemes like fast and frugal trees, quick rules, and implementation inten-
tion schemes. Boosts differ from thinks in that they do not simply school citizens; they equip them with 
rules to live a smarter (and, better) life by making fewer mistakes.
Recently, however, John (2018) has attempted to reconcile the idea of facilitating greater citizen re-
flection within the framework of nudges by proposing the idea of a modified nudge called nudge plus. 
Nudge plus embeds reflective strategies in classic nudges, and as such theoretically promises persistent 
and sustainable behavioural changes while respecting the autonomy and agency of citizens. Nudge pluses 
have been operationalised by Banerjee and John (2020); in that they show that the modification of nudges 
involves a process of perspective transformation in citizens to effectively change their behaviour. These 
devices are proposed as a hybrid nudge-think strategy, one that facilitates both types of cognitive pro-
cesses, fast and slow, in achieving a behavioural change. More recently, Löfgren and Nordblom (2020) 
and Banerjee (2020a) have put forward positive analyses of decision-making that enable policymakers 
to effectively choose between nudges, thinks, boosts and nudge pluses in any given choice setting; and, 
as such, overcome the policy conundrum of choosing a first-best behavioural change intervention, con-
tingent on contextual factors.
This chapter advances the scholarly discourse on nudge theory in behavioural public policy by un-
dertaking a systematic and holistic comparison of these different behavioural interventions along several 
normative and positive directions. In reviewing the work on these interventions, the chapter will revisit 
the behavioural policy cube posited by Oliver (2017) and show that while nudges and thinks/ boosts 
belong to different bootcamps of scholars; nudge pluses share collective features of these tools and as 
such embody a new way of going forward beyond nudges. In this chapter, I will frequently borrow from 
Banerjee and John (2020) and Banerjee (2020a) to understand the mechanistic design of nudge pluses 
and understand their operation. This chapter is motivated to familiarise public policy practitioners with 
a wide range of alternate behavioural-based interventions beyond nudges and address collective action 
problems (e.g. climate change) by breaking the false synonymity of behavioural change interventions 
with nudge-type interventions only.
THE BEHAVIOURAL POLICY CUBE AND ITS ORIGINS
Do public policy practitioners have a choice of tools when faced with a problem? As the ardent reader 
must have guessed from the introduction, yes, they certainly do. For brevity, let’s explore this in more 
detail. Let’s assume that Meera works as an official for the Indian government in the department of social 
care and health policy. Meera, being a public policy practitioner, as part of her first assignment, is tasked 
to devise a plan to counter excessive smoking amongst young adults in the country. What can Meera 
do? Meera knows that she has her traditional policy tools at her disposal; for instance, Meera can initi-
ate social campaigns against smoking. However, smoking is a sticky behaviour and Meera understands 
that there might be socio-cultural connotations associated with smoking. As such, to effectively change 
behaviour, she is open to other ideas. What else can Meera rely on?
To begin with, she can target demand side contractions by using shoves; she can either use a price 
regulation such as the imposition of sin taxes on cigarette consumption, or she can seek a smoking ban (in 
public areas). These regulatory tools are internality targeting and are informed by behavioural economics 
in that an alteration of price or quantity will reduce the cigarette demand in the country. Nonetheless, 
these policies are paternalistic as they do not respect one’s autonomy and agency. Contrarily, Meera can 
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decide to use supply-side contractions, one that targets sellers. An example of such a policy is a budge. 
A budge, for instance, can prevent sellers from adopting tricks that makes smoking, the societal evil, 
more lucrative.
Let’s say, however, Meera believes in maintaining consumer sovereignty and wants to rely on behav-
ioural measures that preserve liberty and, in turn, respect the dignity of the consumers. An example of 
such a behavioural intervention, internality targeting, is a nudge, as discussed before. An example of a 
nudge in this case is to label cigarette packs to make the smoking risk more salient to consumers. Other 
examples include reducing the length of cigarettes, although, such a policy would need mandates regulat-
ing suppliers to begin with. Alternatively, there could be other behavioural measures as well. Take, for 
instance, thinks and boosts. Meera can decide to use educative strategies to school young adults about 
the harms of smoking (e.g. a think) or help them learn quick rules to quit smoking (e.g. boosts) as they 
do in a rehabilitation centre.
Thus, for every policy challenge, there are a range of available alternatives, that a public policy prac-
titioner like Meera can choose from. Oliver, in the Origins of Behavioural Public Policy (2017a), puts 
forward an economic framework that helps us in understanding the different legislative tools available 
to us when faced with a policy challenge. This economic framework, conceptualised as a policy cube 
by Oliver, is shown in Figure 1. The policy cube encapsulates three core features of the ‘libertarian 
paternalism’ framework; namely if an intervention or policy tool is informed by the standard axiomatic 
assumptions of rational man theory or by insights from behavioural theories, if it is internality or ex-
ternality targeting, and if it is regulatory or libertarian in nature (Oliver, 2017b). These three features 
are represented by three main axes of the policy cube namely ab, ac and ad respectively as indicated in 
Figure 1. Movement along a particular axis embodies a particular notion that explains the underlying 
characteristics of the policy intervention. Consider, for instance, the ab axis. Movement along this axis, 
towards the origin, indicates that a policy is informed by insights from behavioural economics rather 
than being driven by a rational economic model. Similarly, as one moves along ac, towards policies 
centred at the origin, one is essentially devising policies that are internality targeting rather than being 
externality focussed. Finally, a movement along ad, towards the origin once again, indicates the liber-
tarian nature of the policy. As such, when a policy maker is centred at the origin a of this policy cube, 
he/ she essentially chooses policies that are behaviourally designed, target citizens’ internalities and are 
libertarian in nature.
In Meera’s world, these can be easily thought of as nudges, thinks and boosts. Similarly, one can 
also represent shoves and budges on this policy cube. As defined by Oliver, budges will lie at the edge 
e of this policy cube such that they are regulatory and externality targeting yet behaviourally designed. 
Meera’s idea to regulate cigarette sellers would be a budge. Contrarily, the shoves would lie at the corner 
d, such that they are regulatory and internality targeting yet behaviourally designed in nature. Meera’s 
idea of imposing a sin tax would therefore lie in this corner. Finally, all tools facing the fbgh plane of 
the policy cube are informed by standard rational man economic theory and hence could be thought of 
as traditional public policy tools.
In the exposition of the remaining chapter as it follows, it is important to reiterate that I will abstract 
from the general study of this policy cube and will only focus on the origin of this policy cube i.e. I will 
unpack the tools that lie at this origin. In doing so, I aim to review and evaluate their features and char-
acteristics while comparing them relative to each other. The latter half of the chapter introduces nudge 
plus in this origin against nudges, thinks and boosts and undertakes a systematic and holistic review of 
these behavioural based interventions.
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Classic Nudges
The term nudge describes the basic form of behavioural intervention as was set out by Thaler and Sunstein 
in their eponymous book. The definition of nudge, much cited, “is any aspect of the choice architecture 
that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly chang-
ing their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to 
avoid.” (Thaler and Sunstein p.6, 2009). Thaler and Sunstein in their original conceptualisation include 
at least seven different examples of nudging; these include defaults, campaigns, commitments, infor-
mation mechanisms, transactional shortcuts, improved design strategies and warnings and reminders. 
Nudges require changing the choice architecture of rules and procedures that, in part, are controlled by 
governments and other agencies through their command of bureaucratic and legal processes which affect 
the eventual choices of citizens. However, as nudges were increasingly scrutinised and evaluated over 
time, scholars pointed out several discrepancies that blurred the classification of what counts as a mere 
nudge; for instance, Hausman and Welch (2010) and Selinger and Whyte (2012) showed that many ear-
lier examples used by Thaler and Sunstein often did not conform to their ideas of a conventional nudge, 
and as such these interventions could at best be considered as examples of ‘fuzzy’ nudges (see Selinger 
and Whyte, pp 127-128, 2011). Even further, Hansen (2013) classified nudges into four different kinds 
typified by their distinction of epistemic transparency of the nudge and the system of cognition it worked 
on. In a similar vein, Baldwin (2014) highlighted the different degrees of nudging. Going forward, to 
simplify this discussion for readers, I abstract from this scholarly debate on the definition of nudges; in 
that I adopt Thaler and Sunstein’s definition whereby an intervention is considered to be a nudge if and 
only if it modifies the choice architecture keeping all other incentives and information unchanged in the 
decision context for the economic agent.
Nudges draw on twenty-five years of research in behavioural economics that sought to find the ori-
gins of human behaviour in the psychological process to modify a simple rational cost calculation using 
the Heuristics and Biases (HB) approach. The HB paradigm aligns itself with the view that given our 
cognitive limitations, we, humans, abide by certain short-cuts (aka heuristics) to reduce our cognitive 
burden, and as a result often run into multiple biases; for instance, availability or salience bias in that 
Figure 1. The behavioural policy cube
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we tend to make decisions based on what’s familiar to us. Nonetheless, the limited cognitive bandwidth 
of human beings implies that traditional state policy tools, ones that require a high degree of cognitive 
capacity, such as legal regulation and taxes/fines, are bound to falter. Often, prescribing such policies 
can cause governments to draw the flak of being called a nanny-state. Classic nudges were argued to 
be easy to introduce as they do not depend on heavy cognitive processes. As such, it was assumed that 
individuals will like these kinds of interventions because they help people to get to where they want to 
go and maintain their autonomy to reject the nudge if they do not want to go along with it.
Nudges promise to retain a faith in rational human action as a desirable state of affairs but acknowledge 
that people need help to come to decisions that approximate to the process. Nonetheless, they have been 
criticised to ‘work in the dark’ and manipulate individuals by making some choices more salient than 
others (Bovens, 2009; Hausman and Welch, 2010). Whilst Sunstein (2016, 2017) has sought to defend 
nudges on the account of consent validation, in that, people who get nudged agree with the nudge there-
after; advances in nudge theory have shown that the public palatability of nudges is conditional on its 
overtness and goals (Reisch and Sunstein, 2016). In line with this, nudges have been recently classified 
into system (or, type) 1 and 2 nudges. A system 1 nudge is purely automatic in its action, for example 
a fly in the urinal or an opt-out default; while a system 2 nudge is largely reflective, often dubbed as 
educative nudges. This bifurcation of nudges gradually paved the way for think strategies that are largely 
deliberative and, hence, actively involve citizens in the decision-making process.
Thinks
Nudges often fail to sustain the behaviour change achieved. While cost-effective, nudges lack persistence 
and their effects fade out over time. Recently, Sunstein (2017), in trying to explain why defaults fail, 
hints that people with strong antecedent preferences can reject a default, while those that have weak or 
in-transition preferences might be influenced by it. However, this raises concerns for the application of 
nudges, such that when the policy maker introduces a rent-seeking intervention, it might not be welfare 
improving for the agent. Nonetheless, in the world of nudges, citizens can avoid being manipulated only 
if they are watchful of these interventions.
Thinks can help in overcoming these limitations. In democratic theory, a think may be seen as a good 
for its own sake while more recent applications tie the use of these mechanisms to desirable policy outputs 
and outcomes and the best decision-making procedures to get to them (Fung and Fung 2004). Examples 
include citizen juries, deliberative polls, and extended consultation, all forms of citizen governance (John 
2009a; 2009b). Such procedures for making public policy are more legitimate if people participate in 
the actual decision; they may be more effective as they require people to understand the nature of the 
policy challenge, which might not be delivered by nudges alone.
Thinks, unfortunately, often mentally drain out citizens given their large cognitive demands (John et 
al., 2013; 2019), and hence are often impracticable for effective interventions. Closely tied to the think 
is the competing idea of a boost, introduced by Hertwig and Grüne-Yanoff, which embodies easy-to-
deliver educative strategies.
Boosts
The boost is a class of behavioural policies that seeks to improve the decision-making power (or com-
petence) of an agent. Boosts differ from other behavioural instruments as they are solely directed to 
7
Rethinking the Origin of the Behavioural Policy Cube With Nudge Plus
 
increase cognitive capacity only. As Hertwig and Grune-Yanoff put it, the goal of boosts is to ‘improve 
people’s competence to make their own choices and to make it easier for people to exercise their own 
agency by fostering existing competences or instilling new ones’ (2017, p 2). Due to their nature, boosts 
are based on an alternative psychological theory that discusses why humans depart from fully rational 
behaviour and show how to improve their decision-making process by upgrading their ‘repertoire of 
decision-making skills’ (the adaptive toolbox).
Although Hertwig (2017, p 144) acknowledges that boosts are very similar to think strategies, a subtle 
difference between the two lies in their conceptual rationales. It is noteworthy that boosts go beyond 
regular schooling mechanisms, unlike most pure thinks which cause self-reflection through learning. 
However, in practice it might be very hard to tell them apart. A good example of boosts is an uncertainty 
management rule to interpret advice given to patients as to how to make good choices, such as over 
treatments that might vary in the likely outcomes. People find it very hard to understand these probabili-
ties, as Kahneman and Tversky (1982) found in their experiments. But with some training, individual 
capacity can be increased to make better decisions, hence the idea of calling such interventions boosts.
Rather than being just another device to improve rationality, boosts are based on a different assess-
ment of cognition than nudges. Boosts rely on the idea that people are intuitive and frugal in their use of 
the minds, and, therefore, interventions need to be targeted to make best use of the common sense that 
people have innately. With a bit of guidance, people can be taught to be Bayesians, for example. Boosts 
work within the prism of the Simple Heuristics (SH) approach i.e. agents, given their cognitive burden, 
choose shortcuts which are often cognitively beneficial but could go wrong at times. However, such 
biases are not systematic and certainly not always tied to the heuristics. Thus, instead of getting rid of all 
heuristics, this approach believes in making such heuristics smarter and intuitive to avoid those occasional 
mistakes. The heuristics work best when the agent’s cognitive skill set and their external environment 
work in tandem, besides being recognizable to the agent i.e. when ecological rationality is reached.
However, boosts assume that all agents have the motivation and competence to benefit from the 
improved decision-making processes resulting from the boosting mechanism. This is very different to 
the classic nudge which assumes a ‘somewhat mindless, passive decision maker’ (Thaler and Sunstein 
p.36, 2009). More importantly, while the proponents of classic nudge theory view economic agents 
as ‘cognitive cripples’, boosts make a sharp departure from this thought process by believing that by 
changing the environment, or their cognitive skills and abilities (competency), an agent will make better 
decisions (Grüne-Yanoff and Hertwig 2016). Grune-Yanoff and Hertwig classify them recently into two 
broad categories: short-term and long-term boosts.
Short-term boosts seek to improve the competence of agents in a specific context or dimension. 
Contrarily, long term boosts improve the general cognitive ability of the agent, equipping him/her with 
a unique skill set that can applied in any decision-making context; for instance, consider the uncertainty 
management rule in the form of recognition heuristic that often gives rise to the ‘less is more’ effect 
(Gigerenzer, Todd, and Group 2000). If an American student, who has never been to the United King-
dom, is asked to pick between London or Gloucester as the more populous city, and is told to go by his/ 
her ‘gut feeling’, the first choice that comes to mind is London since an individual knows less about one 
of the options, and therefore the obvious choice. This is what Kahneman and Frederick (2002) refer to 
as the heuristic being ‘deliberately adopted by System 2’, and it is possible that this rule yields correct 
answers in a majority.
Short term boosts are hard to tell apart from the educative nudges put forward by Sunstein (2019) 
such as labelling, warnings, advertisements, and so on. Long-term boosts, on the other hand, are broadly 
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classified into three categories: literacy boosts, those that improve the probabilistic/statistical numeracy 
of the agent; uncertainty management boosts, those that help in decision making under unpredictable/
uncertain conditions; and motivational boosts, which helps the agent in overcoming behavioural barriers. 
Different variants of these boosts have been tested in varied settings; for instance, literacy skills have 
been shown to improve financial decision making (Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar 2014), and quick food 
rules have helped people in making healthy food choices (Pollan and Kalman 2013).
Nudge Plus
To make deliberative strategies more effective, John and Stoker proposed the idea of nudge plus—a 
modified nudge that embeds reflection as part of the nudge. Nudge Pluses were recently operationalised 
by Banerjee and John. As they write, “nudge plus refers to an intervention that has a reflective strategy 
embedded into the design of the nudge. It can be delivered either as a one-part device in which the clas-
sic nudge and the reflective plus are intrinsically combined, or as a two-part device whereby the classic 
nudge is extrinsically combined with a deliberative instrument that prompts individual reflection on the 
nudge. Examples include an active mechanism design (e.g. a pledge) or information-signalling com-
bined with an opt-out default” (Banerjee and John, p3, 2020). Both the nudge and the reflective plus are 
complementary to each other and central in the functioning of the tool.
Nudge pluses are unique in that they are based on a hybrid interaction of cognitive processes; while 
nudges can be purely automatic (system 1) or reflective (system 2), and thinks are only purely deliberative, 
a nudge plus combines automatic and reflective thinking by placing the nudge close to the plus either 
simultaneously or sequentially. Banerjee and John outline several working examples of nudge pluses; 
these include dual-self pledge devices, GPS enabled devices fitted with AI technology assistants, and 
other classic nudges (like defaults or labels) combined with information or commitment pluses. While 
many nudges already have the potential of reflection built in them, the authors clarify that for an instru-
ment to be typified as a nudge plus, it must involve an active reflective trigger.
Whilst a nudge plus promises greater autonomy and agency for citizens, they cannot always guarantee 
greater effectiveness. Banerjee (2020a) theorises this to be an efficiency-agency trade-off that research-
ers are yet to empirically validate. Nonetheless, such a positive analysis informs policymakers, who 
when faced with a policy conundrum to choose from their behavioural toolkit, can make the first-best 
choice according to the contextual information at hand. This includes the gains of reflection, defined 
as a ‘modification in one’s subjective probability’ by engaging in the process of attentive thinking, and 
the importance of the decision-making task as judged by its decision utility; for instance, a two-part 
nudge plus is theorised to work effectively by increasing the anticipated decision utility only when the 
policymaker believes that the individual stands to make positive gains of reflection for a marginally 
unimportant decision-making task.
In the end, it is hard to avoid concluding that the debate about nudge plus and by implication nudge, 
think and boost turns on a model of cognition to work out what is going on when people are making 
choices. In the next section, I undertake a systematic comparison of these instruments along nine dif-
ferent dimensions, namely, the psychological paradigm it follows, the cognitive interplay it embodies, 
the opacity of the instrument, the reversibility of its effects and associated autonomy for the agent, the 
bias awareness and control it endows citizens with, its relevance to the social planner’s information 
about end goals and benevolence, and lastly the motivation and competence required of the citizen for 
the uptake of the instrument.
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COMPARING NUDGE, BOOST AND NUDGE PLUS
Having reviewed the different behavioural strategies available to the policymaker, how do these differ 
relative to one another? Table 1 compares them and situates them within the different accounts of cog-
nition which explains their rationales. In doing so, the chapter shows that the way forward is to accept 
the argument that nudge pluses are based on a more sophisticated account of cognition; in that nudge 
pluses are truly hybrid policies which combine the best features of reflexive strategies like nudges and 
reflective ones like thinks or boosts.
To begin with, nudges, boosts and consequently nudge pluses are based on different psychological para-
digms. While nudges follow the Heuristics and Biases (HB) paradigm, boosts follow a Simple Heuristics 
(SH) approach. Although both these approaches begin with heuristics as their cognitive foundation, they 
differ in their conceptual foundations in justifying our bounded rationality and their associated failures. 
The proponents of HB presume that all biases are systematic, and that they are usually generalizable 
across the population in a way that a bias will arise when there is a heuristic that is adopted; contrarily, 
those motivated by SH deny this by acknowledging that humans follow short cuts, and that they might 
make wrong decisions at times, but this is not at all systematic. The SH approach believes that there 
remains no need to co-opt citizens’ heuristics, and that their decision making can be improved by simply 
enlarging citizens’ adaptive toolbox. Given that classic nudges and boosts belong to these two different 
psychological paradigms, it can be easily anticipated that their proposed mechanism differs even if they 
lead to the same behavioural outcome; for a starting point of this discussion see Hertwig and Grune-
Yanoff (2016; 2017) as the authors contrast nudges and boosts along several dimensions.
In terms of adhering to a psychological paradigm, there is good reason to believe that nudge plus is 
closely aligned to the heuristics and biases approach. Primarily, nudge plus remains an extension of the 
classic nudge and builds on it by embedding reflective strategies as the plus component. Nudge pluses 
rest on the coherence of dual process theories which, in essence, are denied by the proponents of the SH 
program who believe in the malleability of brain processes. This brings me to my next point of difference, 
the interplay of cognitive processes that define the functioning of these instruments. Research in social 
cognitive psychology has often classified cognitive processes into two different types: a slow system that 
is reflective, often dubbed as System 2; and a fast system that is reflexive and intuitive, often dubbed 
as System 1. As Evans (2007) write, these cognitive processes can interact either simultaneously or se-
quentially as dictated by the ‘parallel competitive’ or ‘default interventionist’ accounts of dual process 
theories. In the parallel-competitive account, both system 1 and 2 cognition are in a constant tussle with 
each other in that there is no pre-defined role for a system when faced with a conflict. On the contrary, 
the default interventionist account is defined by one of the two cognitive systems assuming the role of 
the rectifier. Nudges closely resemble the latter in that system 2 corrects for the biases in system 1 when 
faced with a conflict. To steer individuals to make better decisions, nudges make this process easier by 
tapping into these behavioural biases.
Boosts, on the other hand, differ from nudges in that they are based on a singular, unified cognitive 
process theory. According to its proponents, both cognitive systems co-exist and function simultaneously, 
sharing multiple common characteristics, making it hard to have a clearer distinction between them. 
Banerjee and John (2020) situate nudge pluses closer to the dual processes view. Nonetheless, they posit 
that nudge plus is based on a hybrid account of cognition, in that it is possible to trigger both simultane-
ous and sequential operation of the cognitive systems in administering these devices. According to the 
authors, nudge pluses are rationalised by a sophisticated hybrid model of cognition where the interplay 
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of the cognitive systems is at best context dependant on the type of behavioural change problem that the 
policymaker is facing (2020). This leads me on to the third distinction between these interventions, their 
effectiveness in sustaining a behavioural change, and the way in which they do so.
In thinking about these interventions, we know of classic nudges to effectively change an agent’s 
behaviour (means paternalism), while boosts bring about such a change by improving upon the compe-
tences of the agent. In this context, nudge pluses work by changing behaviour as well, but the change 
is effected twice; first when the nudge is administered and the volitional biases are taken advantage of, 
and second when the agent is given the autonomy to reflect on the nudge and decide on reinstating the 
behavioural change induced by it. In doing so, nudge pluses essentially lead citizens down the path of 
‘perspective transformation’ (Banerjee and John, 2020) which entails a process of updating one’s beliefs 
and perspectives when faced with a reflective stimulus. An individual, for instance, when signs a dual-
self pledge engages in a feedback loop that helps them to constantly update their perspectives (Banerjee, 
2020b). While boosts promise persistent behavioural changes as well, they can differ from nudge plus 
in their cost-effectiveness and the associated cognitive burden imposed on the subject. However, which 
works best remains mostly an empirical exercise, and in theory both nudge pluses and boosts can offer 
persistent behavioural changes unlike classic nudge effects that might eventually wear off.
Interestingly, Banerjee and John (2020) put forward a mechanistic scheme to outline the functional 
differences amongst these instruments. To explain this, let’s consider an example. Consider the characters 
Joanna and Roma. Joanna has recently finished her presentation for her firm in the city centre and has 
been visited by her friend Roma, who also happens to be a vegan. Joanna and Roma are now looking 
to find dinner at a restaurant nearby. The question is, how would they decide on a place, cuisine and a 
particular meal type? And in this decision-making process, how would a policymaker effectively alter 
their behaviour, if need be. As it turns, all of this depends, as Banerjee and John write, on a range of fac-
tors. One, for instance, includes the dispositional (or, agent specific) traits like one’s preferences. Others 
include situational factors, like contextual cues and information, and the choice construct. Contingent on 
these factors, Joanna and Roma reduce their choice to a few alternatives which have underlying properties, 
before finally choosing their meal. In this world of decision making, the authors posit that nudges work 
by altering the choice construct only. Boosts work by changing the search rules, while regulatory tools 
(like shoves) work by altering the property set. Finally, nudge plus works by adding on to the nudges, 
changes in either the dispositional traits or by adding on more contextual cues to the problem at hand 
(Banerjee and John, 2020).
From their mechanistic scheme, it is clear that these behavioural tools work towards the same goal, 
but their underlying causal processes are varied. Once effected, it must be noted that both the nudge 
pluses and the boosts restore the autonomy of the agent and are transparent in their functioning. However, 
with the nudge plus, some concern must be exercised yet again. While the classic nudge component is 
opaque and bypasses agency consent, it is only the plus that brings on board such openness. The degree 
of reflection, however, depends on the magnitude of the plus; thus, the stronger the plus, the greater is 
the autonomy and transparency of the instrument. This is crucial for two reasons; first, there is trade-off 
between transparency, autonomy and cognitive burden, and finding an optimal trade-off is necessary, 
and second, boosts (or, thinks) do not work in all situations, just the same way that classic nudges fail 
to achieve persistent outcomes.
With greater transparency brought on with a plus in the nudge plus, an agent is made conscious of 
their biases that systematically repeat with the heuristics i.e. they undergo perspective transformation. In 
case the policy maker is rent-seeking or blinded by his own biases, any agent who has been administered 
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with a plus can opt-out of the intervention. While with nudges, only watchful agents can block changes 
that are deemed unsatisfactory; the reflective element in the nudge plus takes away this cognitive demand 
for being watchful. Think of the commitment device. A person signs up for the gym membership after 
they have been given an educative nudge (information regarding the pros and cons of regular exercise). 
A variant involves the same commitment device but now with an active prompt that asks them to reflect 
on their future goals. As people sign up for the commitment device and once they are prompted reflect 
on their future-self, they examine the validity of this commitment weighing all the pros and cons that 
they have been recently made aware of.
Now let us assume that the policy maker (in this case the dietician) went wrong in prescribing to 
them a two-week contract nudge when participants actually needed more. As they commit to the exercise 
for the wrong period, since the habit formation process is already in place, and if individuals are now 
prompted to reflect on their choices well enough, they might as well continue as long as they feel it’s 
required, or in worst cases reject the commitment device at the first instance indicating that the policy 
maker has clearly gone wrong. Note in this case, the first response of continuing with the incorrect 
exercising regime will be successful only if the agent is motivated enough to act on his reflection. This 
redirects us to the same policy-theory coherence dilemma that was raised in Hertwig and Grune-Yanoff 
(2017) earlier i.e. nudge pluses also have conditionalities imposed on them for their success1.
Thus, while nudges reduce autonomy and agency2, boosts and thinks promise complete autonomy. 
Nudge plus policies take after the latter in that combining the nudge with the reflective plus offers greater 
transparency and agency for the decision-maker. Furthermore, in a behavioural world, if the policymaker 
suffers from cognitive limitations, the prescription of nudges can be welfare-reducing. However, nudge 
pluses, akin to boosts and thinks, circumvent this concern by allowing individuals to own their process 
of behaviour change and decide for themselves. In a way, in the world of nudge pluses, the policymaker 
can be error-prone at times, but that will not lead to doomsday. All of this, however, is contingent on the 
motivation and competence of the individual, and therefore, nudge pluses place higher cognitive burden 
than their corresponding nudges.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has introduced public policy practitioners to a range of behavioural interventions that ex-
ist in the scholarly literature yet are often left out on in real life policy prescriptions. The origin of the 
Oliver’s behavioural policy cube is far richer than it has been acknowledged for; it certainly extends 
beyond nudges to include other softer interventions like thinks, boosts and consequently nudge pluses. 
In enlarging the standard toolkit of the policymakers, this chapter by no means prescribes an imminent 
substitution of nudges by the alternatives discussed.
Scholarly evidence, sufficiently documented over the last decade, has shown that nudges can work 
effectively in a variety of settings, and therefore must be retained. Nonetheless, when they fail, other 
alternatives could have been considered to begin with. As Löfgren and Nordblom (2020) and Banerjee 
(2020a) theorise in their positive analyses, the choice between these instruments are often contextually 
dependant, and hence there is a need to break the false synonymity of behavioural based interventions 
with nudge-type interventions only in enabling policymakers to choose the first-best policy depending 
on the task at hand.
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In holistically comparing nudge pluses relative to classic nudges and boosts/ thinks, it is clear that 
nudge plus is a hybrid strategy that combines the best features of these instruments. A nudge plus 
closely resembles the classic nudge in that it builds on the heuristics and biases psychological paradigm 
whereby it relies on the dual process theory of cognition. However, nudge plus is more sophisticated 
than a simple parallel competitive or default interventionist account. As Banerjee and John (2020) posit, 
nudge pluses are designed to be hybrid nudge-think strategies that are built on an interactive cognition 
model, where systems 1 and 2 can be either activated simultaneously or sequentially depending on the 
context of application.
Furthermore, they go beyond nudges in mimicking boosts and thinks such that they offer greater 
transparency and respect the autonomy, agency and sovereignty of the decision-makers. Since a nudge 
plus equips agents to own the process of behaviour change, they, in turn, theoretically promise to lead 
to persistent effects that do not fade away quickly as is seen with some of the classic nudge applications. 
An additional benefit of having such inbuilt reflection is the minimisation of an unrealistic expectation 
from the social planner, who in a behavioural world, can also be error-prone and hence, is not always 
required to know of the end goals of all citizens. Nonetheless, just like thinks and boosts, nudge pluses 
require citizens to be goal-oriented, conscientious and motivated to undergo the process of perspective 
transformation in effecting behavioural change.
Hopefully, in times to come, we will see a greater uptake of these behavioural based policies by 
public policy practitioners and researchers; for it is only with greater empirical applications that we can 
sufficiently claim to go beyond nudges with boosts, thinks and nudge pluses.
Table 1. Conceptual Underpinnings of different behavioural policies
Dimension Classic Nudge Nudge Plus Boosts
Psychological Paradigm Heuristics and Biases Heuristics and Biases Simple Heuristics
Cognitive Structure Dual Process Theory Dual Process Theory Malleable cognitive structure
Reversibility Reversible Persistent effects Persistent effects
Opacity Usually opaque Transparent with the plus element Completely transparent
Autonomy Reduced autonomy and agency
Autonomy comes with the plus 
element Complete autonomy
Bias Awareness and Control No Awareness and Control Control given with the plus element
Agent is aware and in control of 
the biases
Social Planner’s information 
about end goals and benevolence
Social planner is assumed 
to be benevolent and aware 
of end goals
Social planner must be aware of 
end goals, but decision is left to 
the agent. Can be rent seeking
No need for social planner to be 
aware of the goals. Social planner 
can be rent seeking
Cognitive error of Social planner Must not be error prone Can be error prone Can be error prone
Motivation and competence of 
decision maker
Not required. The decision 
maker is a cognitive 
cripple
The decision maker must be 
competent and motivated to act.
The decision maker must be 
competent and motivated to act.
Note: Columns 1 and 3 as adopted from Hertwig and Grune-Yanoff (Table 1, p16, 2016; Table 1, p2, 2017)
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITION
Behavioural Policy Cube: The policy cube encapsulates three core features of the ‘libertarian pa-
ternalism’ framework; namely if an intervention or policy tool is informed by the standard axiomatic 
assumptions of rational man theory or by insights from behavioural theories, if it is internality or exter-
nality targeting, and if it is regulatory or libertarian in nature (Oliver, 2017b).
Boost: A boost improves the competency of a decision-maker by enriching his or her repertoire of 
skills and decision tools and/or by restructuring the environment such that existing skills and tools can 
be more effectively applied (Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, 2016).
Nudge: A nudge is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predict-
able way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2009).
Nudge Plus: Nudge plus refers to an intervention that has a reflective strategy embedded into the 
design of the nudge. It can be delivered either as a one-part device in which the classic nudge and the 
reflective plus are intrinsically combined, or as a two-part device whereby the classic nudge is extrinsi-
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cally combined with a deliberative instrument that prompts individual reflection on the nudge. (Banerjee 
& John, 2020).
Think: A think is a schooling strategy that involves large-scale deliberations to enable citizens to 
own the process of behavioural reforms. These often include citizen forums and large-scale behavioural 
therapies.
ENDNOTES
1  Banerjee and John (2020) cite two necessary and one sufficient condition for the uptake of nudge 
pluses.
2  Nudges preserve choice set; however, they make some options more salient than the other, leading 
to claims of being manipulative.
